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Abstract. The absence of a tax compliance theory in the Russian doctrine predetermined 
the objectives of the study –  the search for promising tools to achieve the willingness of 
taxpayers to comply with the tax legislation voluntarily, as well as determining the place 
of coercive measures against taxpayers in order to ensure tax compliance in the Russian 
Federation. The work is based on the complex application of a number of general and 
special research methods (structural and functional analysis, comparative legal, formal- 
logical, system- structural methods). The information base of the research is represented by 
domestic legal acts and judicial practice, official data of the Federal Tax Service of Russia, 
scientific works of both Russian and foreign authors. The study’s main outcome is to validate 
the conclusion that tax administration (in order to ensure tax compliance) must combine 
not only the tools of coercive influence (tax audits, horizontal tax monitoring, anti- tax 
avoidance measures aimed at tackling aggressive tax planning) but also stimulating tools: 
interaction between tax payers and tax authorities in the form of information exchange, 
sending recommendations and proposals to the taxpayer on independent clarification of 
the tax base and tax obligations.
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Налоговый комплайенс  
и инструменты его обеспечения:  
взгляд из России
А. В. Демин, Е. С. Ефремова
Сибирский федеральный университет 
Российская Федерация, Красноярск
Аннотация. Отсутствие в отечественной доктрине отраслевой теории налогового 
комплайенса предопределило цели исследования –  поиск перспективных инструментов 
для достижения готовности налогоплательщиков добровольно соблюдать налоговое 
законодательство, а также определение места принудительных мер воздействия 
в отношении налогоплательщиков с целью обеспечения налогового комплайенса 
в Российской Федерации. Работа построена на комплексном применении ряда 
общих и специальных методов исследования (структурно- функциональный анализ, 
сравнительно- правовой, формально- логический, системно- структурный методы). 
Информационная база исследования представлена отечественными нормативно- 
правовыми актами и судебной практикой, официальными данными Федеральной 
налоговой службы России, научными работами российских и зарубежных авторов. 
Основной результат исследования состоит в обосновании вывода о необходимости 
сочетания налоговой администрацией (с целью обеспечения налогового комплайенса) 
не только инструментов принудительного воздействия (налоговых проверок, 
горизонтального налогового мониторинга, антиуклонительных норм, направленных 
на пресечение агрессивного налогового планирования), но и стимулирующих 
инструментов: взаимодействия налогоплательщиков и налоговых органов в виде 
обмена информацией, направления рекомендаций и предложений налогоплательщику 
о самостоятельном уточнении налоговой базы и налоговых обязательств.
Ключевые слова: налоговый комплайенс, налоговый мониторинг, меры принуждения, 
добровольный комплайенс, партнерские отношения, обмен информацией.
Отчетное исследование было профинансировано РФФИ в соответствии с 
исследовательским проектом № 20-011-00080 А «Соблюдение налогового 
законодательства и правовые способы его поддержания».
Научная специальность: 12.00.00 –  юриспруденция.
Introduction
Tax compliance presupposes that all 
participants of tax relations comply with the 
tax legislation both because of voluntary and 
forced compliance. Nowadays, in the world of 
science tax compliance issues are considered to 
be the most relevant and spark the most heated 
debates. For this purpose, it is worth noting the 
most fundamental monograph by the Australian 
authors Ian Ayres and John Braithwaite 
«Responsive regulation: Transcending the 
deregulation debate». The problems of tax 
compliance are discussed in the works of Mark 
Burton, Julia Black, Robert Baldwin, Martin 
Cave, Gunther Teubner, Valerie Braithwaite, 
Neil Gunningham, Sagit Leviner, Vibeke 
Lehmann Nielsen. The questions of achieving 
a balance between voluntary and compulsory 
tax compliance are discussed in the works of 
Richard M. Bird, Hans Gribnau, Eelco van der 
Enden, Stephen Daly. Ethical and moral aspects 
of tax compliance are outlined in the works of 
Ana Paula Dourado, Justine Nolan, and Benno 
Torgler.
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In Russian science, the concept of tax 
compliance (especially voluntary compliance) 
is studied only tangentially and superficially. 
Some aspects are considered in the works of 
S. A. Arakelov, A. A. Artyukh, D. V. Vinnitsky, 
O. O. Zhuravleva, M. V. Karaseva, A. N. Kozyrin, 
I. I. Kucherov, E. N. Nagornaya, S. G. Pepelyaev, 
D. V. Tyutin, I. A. Khavanov, R. A. Shepenko, 
D. M. Shchekin, and et al. It can be said that 
the theory of tax compliance in the domestic 
doctrine is in its infancy as the doctrinal concept 
of tax compliance has not been developed, there 
is no legal definition for it in the tax and fees 
legislation, and no agreement on doctrinal 
approaches have been reached yet. As a rule, 
some relevant issues of tax compliance are 
considered along with the other issues of tax law, 
its conceptual framework is limited to a small 
number of publications in academic journals.
Theoretical framework
The classic tax compliance model is based 
on the economics- of- crime model developed 
by Gary Stanley Becker in 1968 (Becker, 1968: 
169). Within the framework of «Crime and 
punishment» Becker, using various economic 
methods, considers any offense to be a conscious 
choice of an individual after weighing the 
uncertain benefits of successful non- compliance 
against the risky prospect of detection and 
punishment.
Michael Allingham and Agnar Sandmo 
adapted Becker’s economic model to tax 
compliance further naming it the «deterrence 
model» or «the standard model». The key 
takeaways are published in the now- textbook 
publication «Income tax evasion: a theoretical 
analysis» published in 1972 in the Journal of 
Public Economics (Allingham, Sandmo, 1972: 
323–338). Allingham and Sandmo start with the 
concept of «homo economicus» –  a rational and 
selfish person who pursues maximum wealth 
for his own benefit (taxable income) and makes 
decisions based on the expected benefits of 
successful non- compliance (Allingham, Sandmo, 
1972: 323–338).
As we can see, a central thesis of the 
standard model is that people pay taxes mostly 
for fear of probable material losses resulting 
from the detection of the offense and the 
punishment imposed. Hence the conclusion 
that tax compliance can only be improved by 
increasing tax control and sanctions in order to 
convince potential violators that non- compliance 
is an irrational strategy (in terms of material 
consequences). «It is more trouble than it is 
worth!» is probably the best motto in this context. 
Thus, the state justifies the tax policy based on 
such coercive measures as the intensification 
of tax audits and the increase in the amount of 
tax sanctions.
So, the standard economic model considers 
the problem of tax compliance to be a solution in 
the conditions of uncertainty. The taxpayers are 
supposed to maximise their revenue by weighing 
the pros and cons of tax evasion. Thus, the 
standard model is based on the concept of homo 
economics designed to maximize the expected 
utility by making a rational choice between 
lawful and unlawful behaviour by «weighing» 
positive and negative consequences. The former 
includes the expected benefits of tax evasion 
while the latter mostly relate to the associated 
costs (collection of arrears, fines, losses of 
goodwill, etc.).
Without refuting the validity of the standard 
model, the scientific community has now 
established an understanding of its limitations, 
which is confirmed by empirical research and 
field studies (Bărbuţă- Mişu, 2011: 69–76). 
According to most researchers, the existing 
levels of tax compliance in various legal systems 
cannot be explained solely by law enforcement 
effects (Feld, Lars, Frey, Bruno, 2002: 87–90). 
Thus, the tax compliance significantly exceeds 
the forecasts based on the taxpayers’ self- serving 
instrumental behaviour.
The point is that the total number of 
taxpayers covered by field tax inspections is 
minuscule and decreases annually. Therefore, 
the probability of detecting tax violations and 
imposing sanctions is low. From the perspective 
of a rational homo economicus the risk of 
adverse consequences related to tax fraud 
is very unlikely. Yet, in all tax jurisdictions, 
even the least advantageous in terms of tax 
collection, tax evasion is never regarded as 
something that can be predicted merely by 
economic analysis. At the same time, a significant 
number of taxpayers –  both individuals and 
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organizations –  systematically and fully fulfil 
their tax obligations, regardless of the negative 
organizational and legal incentives applied by tax 
administrations. The secret of tax compliance is 
why people pay taxes, not why they avoid them 
(Feld, Lars, Frey, Bruno, 2007:102). The standard 
model is only partly capable of explaining the 
phenomenon of the compliance behaviour 
prevalence. The question raised –  why do most 
people pay taxes voluntarily? –  resulted in 
the search of and justification for new factors 
lying outside the framework of tax enforcement 
and yet affecting the level of tax compliance. 
Economic factors that affect tax compliance 
include, for example, the type of taxpayer activity 
(Kamleitner, Bernadette, Korunka, Christian, 
Kirchler, 2012: 330–351), the level of his income 
(Gangl, Katharina, Torgler, Benno, 2020: 114–
116), the total and individual tax burden in a 
particular jurisdiction (Kirchler, Muehlbacher, 
Kastlunger, 2018: 23), the intensity of tax audits 
and other verification activities with the tax 
authorities, as well as the size and inevitability 
of tax sanctions.
In turn, non- economic factors include 
tax morals, social norms (Alm, 2019: 395), 
the civil position of the taxpayer (Williamson, 
2017:304), the fairness of taxation and budget 
reallocation (Uslaner, Eric, 2018:175), age and 
gender differences (Alm, Beebe, Kirsch, Marian, 
Soled, 2020: 296), etc.
Statement of the problem
Given the diversity of the determinants 
described above, tax authorities can ensure tax 
compliance by various instruments, combining 
the means of positive incentives and coercive 
influence. In this regard, the following issues 
are put in the centre of our attention:
• identifying specific types of instruments 
to achieve voluntary compliance in the Russian 
Federation;
• determining the role of coercive 
measures in making the taxpayers obey the tax 
compliance in the Russian Federation.
Methods
The methodological basis of the research 
is based on the following methods of scientific 
knowledge: analysis, synthesis, deduction, 
interpretation, forecasting, and the comparative 
method. The comparative method was used in the 
analysis of compulsory instruments for achieving 
tax compliance (the experience of Kazakhstan 
is considered).
Discussion
1. Positive incentives for tax compliance
1.1. Mutual exchange of information
The positive promotion of tax compliance 
is based on the concept of the constructive 
exchange of information between tax authorities 
and taxpayers, based on trust, openness, and 
mutual desire for cooperation. The reciprocal 
exchange of information between tax authorities 
and taxpayers is the basis of modern taxation. 
On the one hand, taxpayers are interested in 
receiving timely and regular information, 
explanatory and interpretative advice regarding 
the interpretation of the application of tax norms. 
This gives them confidence in the lawfulness 
of their activities, allows them to predict tax 
risks, and stabilizes economic turnover. On the 
other hand, tax authorities need to get credible 
information about the facts and circumstances 
relating to the activity of the taxpayers on a 
regular basis.
The modernization of the whole system 
of tax administration is impossible without 
large- scale implementation of electronic 
digital technologies based on various Internet 
platforms and mobile networks. In this context, 
the introduction of the latest IT technologies is 
considered by the Federal Tax Service of Russia 
as a priority in the process of modernizing 
tax administration, which allows automating, 
simplifying and speeding up the process of tax 
management radically.
A network of interactive online services for 
taxpayers is being actively developed in Russia. 
Today their total number amounts to more than 
fifty and it continues to grow. Some of them 
perform general informational and educational 
functions, while others provide information 
about the exact taxpayers. Their implementation 
allows optimizing the workload of territorial tax 
authorities, cutting the red tape and facilitating 
the information exchange for all parties to tax 
legal relations. The key factor in increasing the 
level of voluntary compliance is expanding the 
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range of information services provided by the 
Federal Tax Service of Russia.
At the same t ime, the la rge-  scale 
i nt roduct ion of  d ig it a l i zat ion i n  t ax 
administration produces new threats that require 
their understanding and adequate response. The 
thesis stated above can be exemplified by the 
implementation by the Federal Tax Service of 
Russia of the automatic control system of VAT-2, 
which automatically divides all taxpayers (legal 
entities that have submitted VAT declarations) 
into three subgroups of tax risks, namely, low, 
medium and high.
High- risk taxpayers are those participating 
in the chain of interaction between persons united 
by business transactions, generating document 
flow, and allowing applying tax deductions even 
if the previous participants, so- called «one- day», 
«technical», «transit» organizations, failed to 
pay a real VAT in the budget having no sufficient 
resources (assets) for business activities, and 
also not fulfilling their tax obligations or 
fulfilling them in the minimum amount. As a 
result of the analysis of the links between the 
participants of the «chains», the VAT-2 ASK 
system detects so- called «tax gaps», that is, 
the situation of declaring the amounts of VAT 
deductions that were not paid to the budget by 
the previous participants, and the tax authorities 
take measures to determine the recipient of an 
unjustified tax benefit in the absence of a tax 
source in the budget.
Russian tax legislation does not allow 
for the possibility of enforcing any restrictive 
measures in case of revealing «tax gaps» either 
to the intended beneficiary or to the «technical» 
participants in the document flow, except for 
the refusal to provide a deduction based on the 
results of a tax audit.
The tax authority cannot refuse «transit 
organizations» to accept their tax return even 
if they do not belong to their legal address, 
systematically par ticipate in a chain of 
questionable transactions, the share of deductions 
in the amount of tax calculated from their taxable 
transactions is close to 100 % of the calculated 
amount of VAT, therefore making the amount of 
tax payable minimal.
The judicial practice analysis shows that 
there are such court disputes in which the 
analysis of the VAT-2 automated control system 
is used as a justification for fictitious document 
flow when this information resource serves as 
a proof of the taxpayers’ bad faith.
At the same time, there is criticism of the 
legality of this data application by tax authorities 
when assessing tax reports and determining tax 
liabilities.
From the perspective of A. V. Krasiukov, 
there is a need to legally safeguard the subjects 
against tax authorities abuse through electronic 
communication, for example, by restricting the 
access of tax authorities to the management of the 
VAT control system and the electronic document 
management system (Krasiukov, 2018: 43–50).
Obviously, in this case, the problem is 
that the legal framework is lagging behind 
the pace of digitalization in the field of tax 
administration. Establishing the responsibility 
of the tax authorities, as well as their officials, 
for refusing to accept tax returns and similar 
actions, may resolve the issue of taxpayers 
rights’ violations when accepting a tax return. 
When receiving the information accumulated 
through the VAT automated control system, the 
tax authorities get access to a large amount of 
data relating to the relationship of taxpayers (their 
business operations, actions for calculating and 
paying value added tax, etc.) and at the same time 
constituting a tax secret. The analysis of the data 
received allows us to assume with a greater or 
lesser degree of confidence the presence of tax 
offenses in the chain of interaction.
At the same time, in accordance with 
the powers granted by the tax legislation, 
the tax authorities have the right to use this 
information officially only within the framework 
of tax control in relation to taxpayers, i. e. 
by conducting in- house or on- site tax audits. 
The current tax legislation does not provide 
for another option. The use of other coercive 
measures against taxpayers goes beyond the 
control powers of the tax authorities and at 
the same time may violate the protected rights 
of taxpayers, as illustrated by examples from 
judicial practice.
Therefore, the issue of the necessity and 
expediency of using this information in such a 
way as not to violate the legitimate rights and 
interests of the taxpayer (even if the system 
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classifies it as a «high risk» group) and at the 
same time protect the interests of the budget 
acquires more topicality. It is worth noting 
that VAT-2 automated control system has been 
operating in the country for several years, but the 
problem of «tax gaps» has not yet been solved. 
At the same time, in our opinion, the expansion 
of the tax authorities control powers in this case 
is not a priority in the legal regulation of this 
problem.
As is k nown, two- sided (counter) 
information exchange between fiscal authorities 
and taxpayers is the fundamental basis for tax 
administration and achieving a balance of 
private and public interests. With the continuous 
growth and complexity of tax legislation, the 
growth of «uncertainty zones» in tax legislation, 
the shift in emphasis from formal legality to 
good faith, and the priority of «substance 
over form», taxpayers are interested in timely 
obtaining information available to the tax 
authorities. This allows them to predict tax 
risks, judge the legality of their activities, and 
stabilize economic turnover.
The first step to ensure a balance of private 
and public interests in this case should be to 
provide access to the information of VAT-2 
control system for those taxpayers who are links 
in the «chain» generating «tax gaps». Obviously, 
if some (or even all) of the participants of the 
«chain» interact to obtain an unjustified tax 
benefit, then the information received by the tax 
authority is not a secret for them. The relevant 
information should not remain closed for those 
taxpayers who participate in the «chain» without 
the purpose of tax non- payment. In this case, 
the concealment of information contradicts 
the position of the Constitutional Court of the 
Russian Federation on the need for interaction 
between the parties to the tax legal relationship 
on the basis of mutual openness of information 
about each other’s intentions and actions, its 
availability, and reliability.1
1 This position is reflected in many decisions of the 
Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation, for example, «On 
refusal to accept for consideration complaints of «AGROUP» 
Ltd. for violation of constitutional rights and freedoms by the 
provisions of paragraph 8 of Article 75, paragraph 1 of Article 
388 and subparagraph 1 of paragraph 1 of Article 394 of the Tax 
Code of the Russian Federation»: Ruling of the Constitutional 
Court of the Russian Federation No. 2725-O of 08.11.2018
As it can be seen, the optimal use of the 
information accumulated by the tax authorities 
through the VAT control system is possible not 
only to improve tax administration but also to 
improve the interaction between the parties to 
the tax legal relationship, to create the effect 
of transparency in these relations, even if this 
requires some changes in the way of working 
with confidential information, including changes 
to the norms of Article 102 of the Tax Code of the 
Russian Federation, which regulates the mode of 
use of information that constitutes a tax secret.
1.2. Paid Tax Whistle- blowing
In recent years, the institute of paid tax 
information (tax whistle- blowing) has been 
actively developing in many countries (Dourado, 
Anna, 2018: 422–426). The greater the array 
and variety of sources of information about tax 
violations, the more effectively the national 
system of tax control and administration works. 
The impressive cost- benefit ratio confirms the 
validity of the implementation of the concept of 
tax informants in the national legal order (Givati, 
Yehonatan, 2018: 106–110). In Russia, this tool 
has not yet been implemented. We assume that 
foreign experience in stimulating tax informants 
and their legal protection may be in demand in 
the Russian reality. It is advisable to discuss the 
use of this legal structure for the modernization 
of Russian legislation on taxes and fees, but, of 
course, taking into account the national mentality, 
cultural and legal traditions of our people, as well 
as the large- scale threats and challenges that 
the Russian tax system faces. Moreover, in the 
conditions of unfavourable factors growth in the 
global economy, any effective tools to increase 
budget revenues are becoming very topical and 
significant.
1.3. Tax Commissions
Another tool of compliance positive 
promotion in Russia was associated with the work 
of special tax commissions on the legalization 
of the tax base, which operated for seven years 
in the system of the Federal Tax Service of the 
Russian Federation and was created to prevent 
tax evasion and tax avoidance. The work of 
the commissions was based on the fact that 
tax authorities using various technological 
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resources had an opportunity to determine the 
signs of a tax offense before the appointment 
and conduct of tax audits, and to invite the 
taxpayer to a conversation, letting them clarify 
their tax obligations and eliminate violations. 
Thus, both parties were enabled to clarify 
their positions and resolve any doubts and 
differences without resorting to tax controls 
and legal proceedings. However, the work of 
the commissions on the legalization of the tax 
base was seriously criticized by tax law experts, 
who, in particular, believed that the intervention 
of tax authorities in the formation of the tax base 
and the determination of tax obligations of an 
exact taxpayer is permissible only in cases and 
forms directly provided for by law. In the end, the 
commissions did not «take root» in the system 
of tax authorities.
In our opinion, the practice of the 
commissions could be regarded as a search for 
new forms of interaction between taxpayers and 
tax authorities. If we assume that the purpose of 
interaction (on the part of the state represented 
by the tax authorities) is to avoid negative 
consequences for the taxpayer and the budget 
by correcting all errors without conducting 
a tax audit, then the methods tested by the 
commissions can be regarded as one of the means 
to achieve tax compliance. In our opinion, this 
form of interaction is also a manifestation of good 
tax administration. The Constitutional Court of 
the Russian Federation noted that not only do 
tax authorities have a right but they also must 
require the taxpayer to provide the explanations 
and documents confirming the correctness of the 
calculation and timely payment of taxes (Ruling 
of the Constitutional Court of the Russian 
Federation of 12.07.2006 No. 267-O).
It seems that within the framework of 
transiting to a new –  «partner» –  model of 
tax administration in the Russian Federation, 
it is advisable to adopt norms regulating the 
grounds and procedure for interaction between 
tax authorities and taxpayers in a situation 
where the balance of interests is possible without 
conducting control activities, applying tax 
sanctions or other coercive measures. It is in this 
context that the experience of the commissions 
on the legalization of the tax base is of particular 
interest.
The form of interaction previously used 
by the commissions in the form of sending 
recommendations and proposals for independent 
clarification of the tax base and tax obligations 
can be legalized by giving the tax authorities 
the authority to send a reasoned proposal to the 
taxpayer to clarify their tax obligations.
Certain prerequisites for this are laid down 
in section 5. 2 of the Tax Code of the Russian 
Federation, which regulates tax monitoring. 
Within the framework of tax monitoring, the 
tax authority sends a reasoned opinion to the 
taxpayer organization –  a document reflecting the 
position of the tax authority on the correctness 
of calculation (withholding), completeness, and 
timeliness of payment (transfer) of taxes, fees, 
and insurance premiums. The disagreements 
arisen are considered within the framework 
of a mutually agreed procedure, according to 
the results of which a reasoned opinion can be 
changed or left as it is.
Thus, in our opinion, the practice of the 
work of the commissions on the legalization 
of the tax base deserves not only negative 
assessments. Considering already available 
rules of tax monitoring in the tax legislation, it 
seems appropriate to provide for the following 
rule in the Tax Code of the Russian Federation 
(for example, in Article 31 –  «Rights of tax 
authorities»):
«When finding the facts indicating tax 
violations, the tax authority, outside the 
framework of the tax audit, has the right to send 
a reasoned proposal to the taxpayer to conduct an 
independent assessment of these facts in order to 
clarify its tax obligations on a voluntary basis.»
2. Enforcement of Tax Compliance
In the context of tax compliance, James 
Alm writes, a rational individual makes a choice 
between tax compliance and tax non- compliance 
in a situation of uncertainty, weighing the 
expected benefits of successful deception 
with the risky prospect of being caught and 
punished; people pay taxes only for fear of 
exposure and sanctions. This approach generally 
leads to a very plausible and productive result, 
demonstrating that compliance depends on the 
scale of the audit and tax sanctions (Alm, Jorge, 
2010: 3–4).
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Thus, despite the active introduction of 
incentive tools, the main role in ensuring tax 
compliance is still played by measures of tax 
control, coercion, as well as measures aimed at 
suppressing aggressive tax planning.
2.1. Tax Audits
The main forms of tax control in the Russian 
Federation are in- house tax audits of tax returns 
submitted to the tax authority for specific taxes 
and on- site tax audits of documents and taxpayer 
reports required to determine the correctness of 
tax calculation.
For failure to submit tax returns, the 
relevant officials of the taxpayer are subject 
to an administrative fine of up to five hundred 
rubles, tax sanctions under Article 119 of the 
Tax Code of the Russian Federation in the form 
of a fine of up to 30 percent of the amount of 
tax payable on the basis of this declaration, and 
such a compulsory measure as the suspension 
of transactions on settlement accounts.
In- house tax audits are conducted on all 
submitted tax returns. According to the statistical 
reports of the Federal Tax Service of Russia, 
in 2020, during desk inspections, 34,259,307 
thousand rubles of taxes were accrued as a result 
of the detected violations (in 2011–52,883,130 
thousand rubles). When conducting on- site 
tax audits for 2020, an additional 134,250,128 
thousand rubles were accrued (in 2011–
287,178,704 thousand rubles). The number of 
on- site tax audits conducted in 2020 was 29,601, 
compared to 67,351 in 2011.2
The decrease in the number of inspections 
is due to the orientation of the tax authorities 
to increase the efficiency of tax control, the 
desire to avoid ineffective low- performance 
inspections with small amounts of additional 
charges. Experts in the field of tax audit suggest 
determining the effectiveness of audits, for 
example, by the following indicators (Osipova, 
2020: 31–35):
• the number (relative share) of tax audits 
that revealed violations of tax legislation;
• the number (relative share) of the 




complaints about the results of pre- trial tax 
audits, as well as the number of satisfied claims;
• the number (relative share) of tax 
authorities decisions declared invalid by the 
court;
• the number (relative share) of decisions 
based on the results of inspections, claims for 
which were won in court by tax authorities;
• the amount and proportion of taxes, 
fines, and penalties collected (or voluntarily 
transferred) to the budget after court proceedings, 
i. e. in disputes settled in favour of the tax 
authorities.
Does the appointment of tax audits (taking 
into account these approaches) contribute to 
ensuring tax compliance?
For the budget economic interest, it 
does not matter what resulted in the tax debt: 
the independent calculation of the tax by the 
taxpayer or the determination of the debt by the 
tax authority as a result of control measures. It 
also does not matter what was the reason for the 
incorrect calculation of taxes by the taxpayer 
(for example, with technical errors or intent to 
reduce tax payments). Yet in the tax legislation of 
some states, the appointment of tax audits and the 
application of tax enforcement measures depend 
on the «tax loyalty» of taxpayers. For instance, 
the tax Code of the Republic of Kazakhstan 
allows for the differentiation of taxpayers into 
three groups: low, medium, and high risk- 
and establishes general criteria for assigning 
taxpayers to a certain group. According to the 
Code, tax risk is seen as «the probability of 
non- fulfilment or incomplete fulfilment of a tax 
obligation by a taxpayer, which could or may 
cause damage to the state».3 When assigning tax 
audits, it is taken into account which risk group 
the taxpayer belongs to. Thus, it is in taxpayers’ 
interest not to fall into medium- or high- risk 
groups, since this affects not only the purpose 
of tax audits but also the differentiation of 
subsequent enforcement measures (for example, 
depending on the risk group, the timing of the 
introduction of specific enforcement measures 
differs). In the Russian Federation, tax risk 
assessment criteria are also used for planning 
3 Paragraph 2 of Article 136 of the Code of the Republic 
of Kazakhstan. Available at: kgd.gov.kz/ru/content/
nalogovyykodeks- rk (accessed 23.03.2021).
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tax authorities’ control work4 but this is not 
explicitly stipulated by law. The division of 
taxpayers at the legislative level into categories 
based only on the assessment of tax risks seems 
indisputable in itself since the assessment always 
contains a subjective component and any forecast 
may not coincide with reality, which will create 
additional conflict situations in the relationship 
between tax authorities and taxpayers. As 
long as the tax legislation of Russia declares 
the presumption of taxpayers’ good faith, the 
problem of distinguishing between bona fide 
and unscrupulous taxpayers for them and for 
the tax authorities will remain unsolvable. This 
problem has been widely discussed for years but 
neither the doctrine nor the judicial practice of 
generally recognized criteria and approaches 
has been developed to date.
At the same time, since the technical 
possibility of classifying the taxpayers into 
groups is already available, in our opinion, 
fixing in the tax legislation the rule on tax audits 
exemption of taxpayers who do not belong to risk 
groups for a certain tax period, could become 
an effective tool for ensuring tax compliance.
2.2. Horizontal tax monitoring
The Institute of horizontal tax monitoring 
was adopted by the Russian tax system in 2014.
As follows from the explanations of the 
Federal Tax Service of the Russian Federation, 
tax monitoring is «a method of extended 
information interaction, in which an organization 
provides the tax authority with real- time access 
to accounting and tax accounting data, which, 
in turn, frees the organization from conducting 
desk and field tax audits and retains the ability 
for the tax authority to verify the completeness 
and timeliness of the calculation (payment) of 
taxes and fees.»5
In the scientific and practical literature, 
tax monitoring is considered by the authors 
as an innovative (promising) form of tax 
control (Voronov, 2016: 146). According to 
O. Yu. Bakaeva and E. V. Pokachalova, due to 
4 Order of the Federal Tax Service of Russia of 30.05.2007 no. 
MM-3–06/333@ «On approval of the Concept of the system 
for planning on- site tax audits», In SPS «ConsultantPlus».
5 Letter of the Federal Tax Service of Russia dated 17.12.2014 
no. ED-4–2/26194.
tax monitoring «the relationship between the tax 
authority and the taxpayer is transformed from 
vertical (with mandatory subordination of one 
subject to another) to horizontal (with elements of 
partnership), which allows us to resolve possible 
contradictions and disputes, eliminate existing 
shortcomings in advance, without resorting 
to traditional methods of legal protection» 
(Bakaeva, Pokachalova, 2018: 616–646).
Among the principles of tax monitoring, 
practitioners distinguish the following, «trust, 
open dialogue, and cooperation in relations 
between taxpayers and tax authorities; maximum 
transparency for the tax authority by providing 
online access to taxpayer accounting and tax 
accounting data; exemption from tax audits 
and transition from traditional forms of tax 
control, such as on- site and off- site tax audits, 
to enhanced information interaction» (Pipko, 
2019: 41).
Tax monitoring results in the adoption of 
a reasoned opinion of the tax authority, which 
is adopted in order to clarify the tax authority’s 
position on the correctness of the calculation 
(withholding) and payment (transfer) of 
mandatory payments by the taxpayer, in case 
of establishing a fact that indicates an incorrect 
calculation (withholding), incomplete or late 
payment (transfer) of taxes, fees, insurance 
premiums by the organization. A reasoned 
opinion (if the taxpayer refuses to comply with it) 
may be followed by a mutually agreed procedure, 
but not by actions aimed at bringing the subject 
to responsibility or collecting debts. A reasoned 
opinion (as opposed to a tax audit report) can 
be prepared at the request of the taxpayer, since 
tax monitoring is based on the principles of 
voluntariness and mutual cooperation of the 
parties. Taxpayers are exempt from liability and 
penalties in case of conscientious execution of 
the reasoned opinion of the tax authority.
Rendering a reasoned opinion of the tax 
authority can equip the taxpayers with the 
willingness to comply with tax legislation. In 
case of its non- fulfilment, the tax authority is 
entitled to start an on- site tax audit, following 
which a report will be drawn up, a decision 
on bringing to tax liability will be made, and 
the procedure for compulsory collection of tax 
arrears will be initiated.
– 1644 –
Alexander V. Demin and Ekaterina S. Efremova. Tax Compliance and its Enforcement Instruments: Russian Approach
2.3. Measures aimed  
at curbing aggressive tax planning
Anti- tax regulations designed to suppress 
aggressive tax planning have been in force in the 
Tax Code of the Russian Federation since August 
19, 2017, with the adoption of Article 54.1 – 
«Limits on the exercise of rights to calculate the 
tax base and (or) the amount of tax, collection, 
and insurance premiums».
According to the management of the Federal 
Tax Service of Russia, these regulations comply 
with the general rules on combating tax evasion 
(General Anti- Avoidance Rules, hereinafter 
referred to as the GAAR rules).
«The GAAR rules are a reference point for 
assessing the actions of taxpayers, identifying 
key signs of abuse, such as gaining a tax 
advantage that contradicts the purpose of the 
law; unusual (unreasonable) nature of the 
transaction by the taxpayer; artificial motive – 
intent in constructing operations to obtain tax 
preferences; contradiction to the economic 
content of the transaction in order to obtain tax 
benefits» (Arakelov, 2018: 109–115).
In part 1 of Article 54.1 of the Tax Code 
of the Russian Federation, it is considered 
unacceptable to reduce the tax base and (or) the 
amount of the tax due as a result of misstatement 
of the facts of economic life (an aggregation of 
such facts), about taxable objects subject to 
reflection in the tax and (or) accounting or in the 
tax statements of the taxpayer. Law enforcement 
practice shows that gaining unjustified tax 
benefits, in particular for income tax and value 
added tax, is achieved by including in the tax 
calculation expenses (tax deductions) from 
business transactions that did not actually take 
place through the use of the so- called formal 
document flow, when actually goods (works, 
services) are not purchased, and documents are 
drawn up formally to reduce tax liabilities. Thus, 
it covers the situations of gaining an unjustified 
tax benefit in the absence of real transactions, 
i. e. in cases where the purchase of goods 
(works, services) did not actually take place, 
and the documents submitted by the taxpayer 
are unreliable, which the taxpayer could not 
have been unaware of. This norm corresponds 
to the judicial doctrine previously developed 
by the judicial system on the criteria for 
recognizing a tax benefit as unjustified, reflected 
in the Resolution of the Plenum of the Supreme 
Commercial Court of the Russian Federation No. 
53 of 12.10.2006 and confirmed by judicial acts 
of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation 
(for example, the Ruling of the Supreme Court 
of the Russian Federation No. 305-KG16–10399 
of November 29, 2016). It is worth noting that 
the Federal Tax Service has officially stated 
the position that the new anti- tax rule «is not a 
codification of the rules formulated in Resolution 
No. 53, and represents a new approach to the 
problem of the taxpayer abuse of their rights, 
considering the main aspects of established 
judicial practice» (Yakushev, 2020: 4–7).
In part two of Article 54.1 of the Tax Code of 
the Russian Federation, the following situations 
are described: when the transactions (business 
operations) affecting the amount of tax payments 
really took place, namely taxpayers obtained 
goods (works, services) but from different 
suppliers (contractors). To exclude unjustified tax 
minimization, legislator considered it important 
to curb the rights of taxpayers –  they are allowed 
to minimize the tax base and (or) the amount of 
the tax when complying with the two conditions:
• the main objective of the transaction is 
other than non- payment (incomplete payment) 
and (or) offset (refund) of the tax amount;
• transactional obligation is fulfilled by a 
person who is a party to the contract concluded 
with the taxpayer, and (or) by a person to 
whom the obligation to perform the transaction 
(operation) is transferred under the contract or 
by law.
By introducing these conditions, the aim was 
to prevent unjustified receipt of tax benefits, when 
the actual economic relations of the taxpayer for 
the purchase of goods (works, services) exist with 
real suppliers (contractors), and legally they make 
transactions with «technical» firms, which, as 
a rule, do not properly pay taxes on their sales 
operations.
Applying this rule, the tax authorities 
refuse to deduct VAT, as well as to take into 
account income tax expenses on transactions 
with «technical» firms.
In the judicial practice established before 
the adoption of this rule, a different approach 
was exercised. In particular, the decree of the 
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Presidium of the Supreme Commercial Court 
of the Russian Federation No. 2341/12 of 
03.07.2012 indicated the legal position on the 
unfounded refusal to accept income tax expenses 
for accounting in the case when a business 
transaction (for example, the delivery of goods) 
actually took place, the expenses were incurred 
and the prices did not exceed the market prices 
for similar goods (works, services). This position 
is also held by some courts when considering 
tax disputes under Article 54.1 of the Tax Code 
of the Russian Federation (for example, the 
Decision of the AC ZSO of 09.07.2020 in case 
no. A27–17275/2019).
The Federal Tax Service of Russia has 
repeatedly expressed its opinion in letters (for 
example, letter No. SA-4–7/16152@ dated 
16.08.2017) that when applying Article 54.1 
of the Tax Code of the Russian Federation, 
the tax authority does not calculate the scope 
of the rights and obligations of a taxpayer who 
has allowed a distortion of the actual economic 
meaning of a financial and economic transaction. 
Otherwise, taxpayers will understand that they 
are not risking anything, and the likelihood of 
reviewing the results of the calculation in court 
is quite high.
In this regard, the anti- tax nature of the 
norm is devalued, since non- compliance with 
the rules established by it does not bear material 
consequences for the violator, except for bringing 
to tax liability and charging penalties for late 
payment of taxes.
The courts also point out that the norm in 
question does not prohibit the so- called «tax 
reconstruction» of the tax liability for income 
tax, so it is quite permissible. Complete non- 
acceptance of income tax expenses in the 
event that the reality of the service provision 
(purchase of goods) is not refuted by the tax 
authority during the audit, inevitably leads to a 
distortion of the real amount of tax liabilities for 
income tax. The amount of income tax may be 
additionally charged for payment to the budget 
in such a way as if the taxpayer did not abuse 
the right. Otherwise, in the opinion of the court, 
additional tax assessment in a larger amount than 
it should be becomes an additional measure of 
liability, which is not provided for by the current 
tax legislation (see the decision of the FAS of 
the Ural District of 23.10.2020 No. F09–5758/20 
in the case A76–46624/2019). And it is hard to 
disagree.
Thus, there are discrepancies in the 
understanding of the norm of Article 54.1 
of the Tax Code of the Russian Federation 
as anti- tax, which can be regarded as legal 
uncertainty, which currently creates obstacles 
to achieving tax compliance when applying the 
GAAR rule in Russia. From our perspective, 
the uncertainty of application results from 
the lack of a legally established mechanism 
for restoring the rights and obligations of the 
parties to the tax relationship if it is proved that 
the taxpayer has violated the limits of rights 
established by Article 54.1 of the Tax Code of 
the Russian Federation for calculating the tax 
base and the amount of taxes. Such rules are 
likely to be developed in the future by judicial 
practice, and then the gap will be filled by the 
legislator.
Conclusion
Tax compliance means following the 
letter and spirit of tax legislation on the part of 
taxable persons, regardless of their motivation. 
The standard economic model generally 
reflects tax realities correctly and can be used 
as a basis for tax policy development. At the 
same time, the problem of tax compliance 
is too complex to be exhaustively described 
by a purely economic approach. Taxpayers’ 
motivations are rather multifaceted. Therefore, 
a standard model is subject to expansion 
and supplementation by taking into account 
numerous non- economic factors that affect 
compliance.
The internal motivation to pay taxes can be 
determined not only by the threat of detection 
and punishment, but also by various factors, 
including non- monetary ones. People’s ideas 
about taxes are always more than a rational 
comparison of costs and benefits. Individual 
and group ethics, national mentality, prevailing 
mores, traditions and stereotypes, civic 
maturity, conformity, value orientations, 
perception of justice or injustice of the tax 
system, irrational motivations, etc. play an 
important role in the formation of tax- relevant 
behaviour models. The choice between lawful 
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and unlawful behaviour is determined not only 
by pragmatic considerations of the benefits and 
costs of non- payment of taxes, but also by value 
factors, in particular, the deeply inherent desire 
for justice in most people.
Accordingly, tax administration can ensure 
tax compliance through various legal and non- 
legal instruments, including both instruments of 
coercive influence and instruments of voluntary 
incentives –  in various combinations.
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